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Abstract 
When the Apartheid-regime fell in 1994, 87% of farmland in South Africa was owned by 
white farmers. The newly elected government led by President Mandela emphasized the need 
for a rural reform targeting the poor. The main targets in the initial phase of the reform were 
poverty alleviation, stimulation of economic growth and redistribution of land. 
The thesis analyses the impact of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development-
program (LRAD) in South Africa on monthly consumption expenditure per capita. The cross-
section data set from the Quality of Life 2005 land reform beneficiary survey in South Africa 
provided by the Norwegian Institute for Urban- and Regional Research and Henrik Wiig will 
be used for an impact assessment analysis.  
Keswell et al.(2009) provided an analysis of the average impact of the LRAD program on 
consumption. The authors concluded that the impact on monthly per capita consumption 
expenditure is positive and robust when controlling for selection bias. Following the approach 
used by Keswell et al. (2009), the average impact of the LRAD program on consumption is 
analyzed. The analysis is extended to tests of whether results are consistent in all provinces 
and when comparing the households of male and female household heads. Whether the 
LRAD program has had a positive impact on consumption expenditure per capita is the main 
hypothesis of the thesis. 
The analysis shows a positive effect of the LRAD program on monthly consumption 
expenditure. The average impacts found are of lesser magnitude compared to the average 
treatment effects found by Keswell et al. (2009), likely due to weaker ability to reduce 
selection bias. In the extended analysis, tests reveal that households of male household heads 
on average are likely to have a positive effect on consumption from obtaining land through 
LRAD. The effect on female-headed households is ambiguous. Large differences are found 
on the provincial level. Beneficiaries in KwaZul-Natal and Gauteng exhibit large average 
increases in consumption, while large negative impacts are found in Eastern Cape and 
Mpumalanga. 
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1 Introduction 
When the apartheid-regime fell in 1994, 87% of farmland in South Africa was owned by 
white farmers. The first post-apartheid government in South Africa emphasized the need for 
rural reform targeting the poor. The initial phase of the reform had poverty alleviation, 
stimulation of economic growth and evening out the distribution of land as its main goals. A 
target was set for 30% of all white-owned agricultural land to be distributed to previously 
disadvantaged people within 5 years.  In 2008, about five percent of the land had been 
transferred. The land redistribution program will be the primary focus of this thesis. 
The Department of Land Affairs in South Africa commissioned a large household survey in 
order to review projects implemented throughout the reform. The Quality of Life-dataset 
(QoL) is constructed for an impact assessment-approach, where a nationally representative 
sample of beneficiaries can be compared to an equal sample of households in the process of 
obtaining land through the reform. These household can be assumed to possess the same 
characteristics. Using Stata 11.0, the cross-section data set from the QoL 2005 land reform 
beneficiary survey in South Africa provided by NIBR and Henrik Wiig will be used for an 
impact assessment analysis of the current reform. The data was collected in the period 
September 2006 to January 2007. The control group was limited to households already in the 
process of receiving land, to ensure that beneficiaries can be compared to households of 
similar characteristics. 
The focus of the thesis will be to analyze the impact of the reform on consumption per capita, 
using the Quality of Life dataset. Keswell, Carter and Deininger (2009) analyzed the average 
impact of the LRAD program on consumption in the article “Poverty and Land Ownership”. 
The authors concluded that the impact on monthly per capita consumption expenditure is 
positive for the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development-program (LRAD) 
households when controlling for selection bias. Though the results are robust for a variety of 
statistical assumptions, the magnitude of the impact is less clear cut as the size of average 
treatment effect varies from method to method. 
Following the approach used by Keswell et al. (2009), the average impact of the LRAD 
program on consumption will be analyzed. The main hypothesis of the thesis is that land 
reform has had a positive impact on consumption expenditure per capita. In addition, the 
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hypothesis will be tested for consistency in all provincs and will be examined with regard to 
gender differences among household heads.  
A propensity score matching-approach will be used to attenuate the effect of factors that 
affect both whether a household has already obtained land and consumption expenditure, 
known as selection bias. The idea is to compare consumption levels for households when 
factors affecting treatment status are kept constant. Beneficiary households are matched and 
compared with households in the process of obtaining land on the basis of observable 
characteristics. Selection bias will be reduced if the observable factors that affect selection 
into the treatment group are controlled for.  
A positive effect of the LRAD program on monthly consumption expenditure is found. The 
extended analysis reveals that households of male household heads on average are likely to 
have a positive effect on consumption from obtaining land through LRAD. The effect on 
female-headed households is ambiguous. Large differences are found on the provincial level. 
Beneficiaries in KwaZul-Natal and Gauteng exhibit large average increases in consumption, 
while large negative impacts are found in Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga. 
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2 Post-Apartheid South Africa 
In 1994, the South African people closed the book on four decades of white apartheid rule. 
Although the passage from apartheid to democracy has brought immense changes, South 
Africa is still struggling with high unemployment and pressing inequality.  
Picture 1: Map of South Africa
1
 
 
Source: ANC (2010). 
                                                 
1
 Lesotho and Swaziland are not part of South Africa 
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Graph 1: GDP in South Africa and its neighboring countries 
 
Source: The International Monetary Fund (2009). GDP is given in billion USD at current prices. 
 
South Africa is by far the largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. The graph illustrates the 
difference in GDP to the neighboring countries Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and 
to Tanzania and Angola, two countries in southern Africa of approximately the same size as 
South Africa. 
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Graph 2: GDP per capita in South Africa and its neighboring countries 
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Source: The International Monetary Fund (2009). Gross GDP per capita given in USD at current prices. 
Graph 2 shows South Africa’s GDP per capita compared to its surrounding countries. South 
Africa is second only to Botswana, after Botswana discovered and successfully invested large 
deposits of natural resources in the late 1990s.  
Income per capita in South Africa has grown in the period from 1995 to 2005 due to 
expansions of social security systems, increased employment and wage growth. The positive 
income growth was marginally larger for the poorest than for individuals from 60th to 70th 
percentile. However, those on top of the income distribution benefitted even more, sustaining 
a skewed distribution (The National Treasury, 2008). 
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2.1 Poverty in the first decade of freedom 
Table 1 gives percentage of the population with incomes below R174 a month, which is 
equivalent to an income of one US dollar a day. 
Table 1: Poverty headcount rates for South Africa 
  Headcount rate 
  1995 2005 
  Poverty line: R174 a month 
African 38.18% 27.15% 
Colored 14.62% 12.30% 
Asian 0.82% 1.60% 
White 0.23% 0.01% 
Total 30.92% 22.68% 
Source: (The National Treasury, 2008), p. 18. 
 Table gives percentages of the population with monthly consumption 
expenditure (in 2000 Rands) below the poverty  
 The poverty line of R174 a month is equivalent to 1 USD per day, measured in 
2000 USD. 
 
The table depicts the South African poverty as strongly dependent on ethnicity. Black 
Africans accounted for a disproportionate share of total poverty after Apartheid, and still 
does. Only 0.23 per cent of white South Africans had incomes below the poverty line, 
compared to 38,18 per cent of Africans by the end of Apartheid (The National Treasury, 
2008). Progress made over the following decade has not improved the relative poverty 
situation for Africans, although the absolute income poverty was reduced from 1995 to 2005. 
While only 0.01 per cent of white South Africans had incomes below the poverty line in 2005, 
the rate was 12.30 per cent for African descendants. The results are confirmed by the mean 
poverty gap levels
2
 (The National Treasury, 2008). 
Poverty in South Africa is a distinctively rural problem, and was therefore the initial focus of 
the land reform. In 2001, 46% of rural households had an income of less than USD 2 per day, 
while only 16% of urban households were considered as poor according to the same index 
(Leibbrandt, Poswell, Naidoo, Welch and Woolard, 2005).  
                                                 
2
 The mean poverty gap level is the mean income of individuals below the poverty line as a percentage of the 
poverty line. 
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Female-headed households still account for a disproportionate fraction of South Africa’s poor. 
More that half of the individuals considered as poor lived in female-headed households, even 
though only 43 per cent of the population in total lived in such households (The National 
Treasury, 2008). Income poverty for women is typically associated with insufficient income. 
This reflects a high unemployment rate for females and low wages stemming from a relatively 
lower set of education. The land reform seeks to target female household heads in order to 
alleviate this issue (D.L.A., 2008). Thus, income poverty tends to be reproduced as a 
disproportionately female problem. Average increase in consumption expenditure per capita 
of female-headed households will in the following analysis be tested towards the equivalent 
result for male-headed households. 
Poverty differs largely on the provincial level, both in rates of change and in absolute levels. 
Western Cape and Gauteng have poverty levels substantially below the national average. 
Gauteng, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal all experienced increases in both headcount rates and 
poverty gaps (The National Treasury, 2008). All other provinces experienced declining 
headcount rates of poverty. 
The National Treasury (2008) concluded that the persisting inequality of wealth is largely a 
result of the inability of government policy to alter existing disparities in ownership, income, 
and the general ability of individuals to take advantage of opportunities. These entrenched 
inequalities reduce redistributive effects of economic growth, where already wealthy 
individuals possess better abilities in profiting. The program has only been able to redistribute 
modest amounts of land to a minority of the rural population, leaving the underlying structure 
of the agrarian economy in South Africa intact (Lahiff, 2008). 
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2.2 Demographic changes 
Table 2: Population and household size 
 1996 2007 1996 - 2007 
Population 40.58 48.50 20% 
Households 9.06 12.50 38% 
Average household size 4.6 3.9 -15% 
Source: (The National Treasury, 2008). 
 Numbers in column 1 and 2 are given in billions. 
 Last column shows percentage change from 1996 to 2007. 
The population grew by 20 per cent from 1996 to 2007. At the same time, the number of 
households grew by 39 per cent, showing a clear unbundling of households (The National 
Treasury, 2008). Average households in the population exhibit different average sizes 
compared to the households observed in the Quality of Life-dataset. A possible explanation is 
that rural households are larger on average, and to a larger extent contain distant relatives and 
other individuals participating in the household production. (Statistics South Africa, 2008; 
May, Keswell, Bjåstad and van den Brink, 2009). 
2.2.1 Changes the structure of the economy 
Employment in agriculture has suffered from growth in other sectors. While business-services 
grew, the employment in agriculture, mining and manufacturing decreased substantially (The 
National Treasury, 2008). 
Table 3: Reduction in jobs by sector, 1995-2004 
 Reduction in jobs Per cent reduction 
Mining 177 000 -29.0% 
Agriculture 112 000 -12.1% 
Manufacturing 165 000 -11.7% 
Source: (The National Treasury, 2008), p. 97. 
 The last column gives reduction as a percentage of total number of jobs within the sector in 
1994. 
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Agriculture’s contribution to GDP declined substantially relative to other sectors as subsidies 
to the sector were reduced after apartheid. The agricultural sector has great potential in job 
creation and rural poverty alleviating. Increasing government support may be a necessary 
mean for fully utilizing this potential (The National Treasury, 2008). An important labor 
market trend is the growing importance of skills. People without training are not able to 
participate in the fastest growing sectors in the economy and seem trapped in the informal 
sector (Kraak, 2005). 
The labor force grew at twice the rate of the growth in population and employment in the first 
decade after termination of the apartheid rule.  The 1.6 million jobs created between 1995 and 
2003 fell well short of the increase in labor supply of 4 million individuals. Thus, 
unemployment rose from 15 per cent in 1995 to its 2001 peak of 31 per cent. The growth of 
women from rural areas entering the labor force was particularly noticeable. 
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3 The South African Land Reform 
The first post-apartheid government in South Africa emphasized the need for rural reform 
targeting the poor. The initial phase of the reform had poverty alleviation, stimulation of 
economic growth and evening out the distribution of land as its main goals. In 2008, a modest 
amount of approximately 5 percent of white-owned agricultural land had been transferred to 
previously disadvantaged individuals, a result well off the initial 30% target (Hall, 2009). 
The reform consists of three dimensions: Land tenure reform, restitution and redistribution. 
The tenure reform was implemented to improve the land rights of individuals who had been 
refused to own or rent land freely, through securing tenure rights for the land where they live. 
Many were forcefully removed from their properties during the Apartheid rule. The restitution 
program was created to compensate or restore property rights for those able to prove forceful 
deprivation of property. Land redistribution was the main instrument to redress the gross 
imbalance in landholdings between whites, blacks and the colored (Deininger, 1999). In 2001, 
the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development program was initiated as the main tool 
for redistributing land for agricultural use. This program will be the main focus of this thesis. 
3.1  Initial phase 
The government’s initial “White Paper” on the land reform defined intended beneficiaries in 
broad, almost exclusively racial terms (Lahiff, 2008). The authorities emphasized the 
importance of maintaining public confidence in a stable land market, and decided on a willing 
seller, willing buyer-approach. The government was responsible for establishing a framework 
to accommodate transfers of land. Landowners willing to sell land could offer property to the 
authorities, which organized the transfer to households (Deininger, 1999).  
In contrast to the land reforms in the neighboring countries Zimbabwe and Namibia, South 
Africa allowed for local communities to take initiative to land purchases, which the 
government facilitated through provision of grants (Cliffe, 2000).  
The first land redistribution program was called the Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant 
(SLAG). It features a one-time cash grant given by the Department for Land Affairs (DLA). 
The program targeted mainly blacks from rural areas.  In an effort to alleviate rural poverty, 
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only those with monthly salaries below R 1500 were egliable for a grant (Deininger, 1999). 
The SLAG program was effective from 1995 to 2000. During that period, 1.2% of white-
owned land was redistributed through the program (D.L.A., 2009). 
3.2 Current reform policy 
Table 5 gives province-specific information about land redistribution projects. The large 
differences in land areas per project can be explained by regional differences in land quality, 
and can partly explain why the comparatively arid Northern Cape approve larger land sizes of 
projects.  
Table 4: Land redistribution projects initiated in 2006, by province 
Province     Projects Hectares, total 
Average 
hectare/project 
Average 
cost/project 
Average 
cost/hectare 
Eastern Cape 53 21 983 475 475 243 1 146 
Free State 57 24 721 434 776 381 1 790 
Gauteng 48 10 533 219 1 895 232 8 636 
KwaZulu-Natal 54 27 808 515 2 088 804 4 056 
Limpopo 15 5 574 372 674 733 1 816 
Mpumalanga 48 8 808 184 1 836 765 10 009 
Northern Cape 36 82 160 2 282 - - 
North West 7 2 512 359 1 744 286 4 861 
Western Cape 36 135 208 3 756 3 235 358 861 
Total  354 319 307 902 1 412 929 1 566 
Source: Lahiff (2008), p. 24. 
 The table shows sizes and costs of projects approved and initiated in 2006, in 2006 Rands. 
3.2.1 The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
Program 
The SLAG program was succeeded by the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
(LRAD) program. The major difference to SLAG was the removal of the income limit for 
applicants. Thus, the new program did not target the poorest. A minimum own contribution of 
R5000 was now required to secure a sufficient stake in the project. LRAD sought to a larger 
extent to help beneficiaries become efficient farmers, using the same market-led approach as 
the former program SLAG.  
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The main objectives of the program are outlined in the policy framework document “Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development” (The Minster of Land Affairs, 2001): 
 Increase access to agricultural land for black Africans, Colored and Indians  
 Overcome legacy of past racial and gender discrimination in ownership of farmland 
 Facilitate structural change over the long term by assisting black people who want to 
establish small and medium-sized farms 
 Stimulate growth in agriculture 
 Expand opportunities for promising young people who stay in rural areas 
 Empower beneficiaries to improve their economic and social well-being 
 Enable those previously accessing agricultural land in communal areas to make better 
productive use of their land 
The role of local authorities was promoted in LRAD, where the responsibility for dealing with 
applications and follow-up were delegated from national to local authorities (Cousins, 2002). 
3.2.2 Gender and LRAD 
LRAD targets state that no less than one third of the total amount of transferred land shall be 
accrued to women. As the program opens up for individual applicants, females can apply for 
land grants for their own right. The program guidelines stress the importance of encouraging 
females to apply to redress the gender imbalance in land access and ownership (The Minster 
of Land Affairs, 2001).  
3.2.3 Sliding scale grants 
Depending on the amount of own contributions, beneficiaries can access grants on a sliding 
scale. The minimum own contribution of R5 000 enables applicants to apply for a R20 000 
grant. The maximum grants is set to R100 000, and requires an own contribution of at least 
R400 000. The contributions can be in the shape of cash, labor or assets. A limit of R5 000 is 
set for own contributions of labor, and requires a significant amount of work to be done by 
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beneficiaries in the establishment of the project. Grants are used for acquisition of land, 
investments in land improvements, capital assets and infrastructure (The Minster of Land 
Affairs, 2001). 
Grant for a specific beneficiary household is calculated on the basis of its amount of 
individuals of 18 years or older. Individuals can thus apply as groups to access larger grants. 
Group production projects are discouraged. Small-scale farmers may apply as groups, but 
only for the sake of group ownership with individual production. 
3.2.4 Critique 
A modest amount of 4.8 million hectares of the total target of transferring 24.9 million 
hectares of white-owned agricultural land by 2014 has been successfully transferred. A review 
done by the Treasury in 2008 considers the lack of post-settlement support and lack of focus 
on sustainable use of the land as the main reasons for the negative impact the reform has had 
on agricultural productive capacity (The National Treasury, 2008). 
Lahiff (2008) listed several other features of LRAD and SLAG as possible reasons for the 
insufficient achievements. Limited evidence suggest that young people, the unemployed and 
farm workers have been particularly poorly served. The new targeting criteria in LRAD do 
not improve possibilities for these groups, as there are no national guidelines for how to 
prioritize and make conflicting needs for these groups meet. The reform has neither been able 
to increase agricultural productivity, and only to some extent been successful in redistributing 
land (Lahiff, 2008). 
3.2.5 Current status 
From 1994 to 2008, 3,123,769 housing subsidies were approved at a cost of R48.5 billion. 
The access to state-subsidized housing opportunities accommodated housing for almost 10 
million citizens (The National Treasury, 2008). Overall, a total of R61 billion worth of 
housing or land assets have been transferred from the government to the South African people 
(D.L.A., 2009). 
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Since 2005, the DLA has implemented new policies, shifting towards a more supply-led 
approach. The responsibility of indentifying land is no longer placed entirely on beneficiaries, 
though grants are still available side by side with the proactive purchases.  
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4 Land reform theory 
Productivity gains from redistribution of agricultural land are demonstrated in a large body of 
research. Moene (1992) states that land reforms has an unambiguously non-negative effect on 
production in the commercial farming sector, independent of the amount of available 
agricultural land.  
An efficiency benefit from land redistribution arises if transfers of land from large 
landholders to small landholders reduce the marginal supervision costs associated with 
employing hired labor. Thus, transferring land from large, wage-operated farms to smaller, 
family-operated farms makes these costs dissipate, increasing agricultural productivity. This 
is known as the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity (Binswanger, 
Deininger and Feder, 1995). 
Binswanger et al. (1995) state that economies of scale in the agricultural sector stem largely 
from processing and marketing, not from the farming operation itself.  Further, if labor is the 
largest component of total costs in commercial agriculture, economies of scale in processing 
is not sufficient to give large farms an advantage over smaller, family-operated farms. Large 
farms will be more productive than smaller farms if coordination problems in processing are 
found in combination with economies of scale in processing. This is the only state where the 
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity will not be valid. Nevertheless, large 
landowners using hired labor will improve profitability by renting land to small-scale farmers 
in other states.  
An apparent problem with tenancy contracts is credit rationing (Deininger, 1999). Coasean 
bargaining theory concludes that in the absence of impediments to efficient bargaining, 
competitive markets will allocate property rights to those that can use them most efficiently, 
irrespective of initial wealth. Efficient users will be able to compensate initial property right 
holders (Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis, 2001). Thus, if the landless are able to use the land 
more productively, overall efficiency will increase if land is transferred to them and initial 
landowners are compensated.  
Credit constraints and imperfect information about the abilities of landless individuals will 
distort the market-induced efficient equilibrium, irrespective of whether a land transfer is 
efficiency-enhancing. This problem is known as the agency problem in incomplete markets, 
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and may be attenuated by asset redistribution (Besley and Burgess, 2000). A land reform 
facilitating asset redistribution will thus enhance agricultural productivity and give lasting 
effects on poverty and economic growth. 
During the apartheid regime, land allocations were distorted by heavy restrictions on land 
ownership for black individuals. To address the imbalance in land holdings, it was necessary 
for the South African authorities to reduce the credit constraints of the landless. The screening 
process in the LRAD program is an effort to mimic the competitive allocation, by only 
choosing individuals believed to be able to sustain a certain minimum of productivity. But as 
agricultural productivity is only one of the many sub-goals of the program, transfers of land 
are not made solely to individuals expected to increase the productivity of farms. 
Pranab, Bowles and Gintis (2001) argue that mandated asset redistributions, when sustainable 
in the competitive equilibrium, will allow the non-wealthy to engage in productive projects 
that would not otherwise have been undertaken. The social welfare gains from a productivity 
enhancing asset redistribution accrue to the recipients. It is hard to recover the public costs of 
land acquisition from the beneficiaries without removing their incentives to engage in 
productive activities on transferred land. The society in total must bear the costs of 
redistribution through higher taxes. It is therefore crucial that recipients of land benefit at a 
level exceeding the costs (Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis, 2001). 
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5 Empirical background 
Empirical evidence support the theoretical findings on the ability of land reforms to provide 
equity and efficiency benefits. Brazil and Colombia have initiated negotiated land reforms 
based on a willing seller-willing buyer approach.  
The main goals of the land reform in Colombia in the 1960s and 70s were to correct the 
inequitable distribution of land and increase agricultural productivity. As in South Africa, 
local authorities were given large responsibilities for the implementation. The experience 
from Colombia showed the importance of technical support and access to credit markets, as 
the sustainability of initiated land reform settlements were limited. The initial approach gave 
little attention to improvement of agricultural productivity. Deininger (1999) highlighted two 
reasons for the failure of many land reform projects in Colombia. First and foremost, the 
absence of a fully funded plan to undertake all necessary investments was not in place. 
Interlinked to this issue was the lack of credit, as local authorities were unable to sufficiently 
reduce credit market imperfections. 
Brazil has a similar approach to land reform. Results presented by Guilherme B. R. Lambais 
(2008) suggests that the recent Brazilian land reform has been successful in alleviating rural 
poverty. The effect on agricultural productivity is less clear-cut, and the failure of 
improvement can largely be attributed to lack of institutional assistance. 
5.1 The South African Land Reform 
Keswell et al. (2009) used the Quality of Life-dataset from 2005 to analyze the impact of the 
LRAD program on poverty alleviation in South Africa. The authors estimated the average 
treatment effect of obtaining land on consumption.  
A combination of screening and propensity score matching was used to compare the per 
capita consumption expenditure of beneficiary households and control group households. The 
approach, by the authors referred to as a “pipeline matching strategy”, is constructed to 
attenuate the effect on consumption of unobservable differences in selection into the program.  
Qualitative studies were made use of by Keswell et al. (2009) to map supply-side factors 
believed to capture determinants of selection into the treated group. The studies were used to 
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pre-screen projects deemed unlikely to be approved, in an effort to reduce the level of 
heterogeneity between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Passing the fourth stage of the 
application process was considered to be the main predictor of grant approval, and projects 
not meeting this criterion were screened out of the sample. 
5.1.1 Empirical findings: 
The various programs of the land reform were first tested for a significant treatment effect 
without controlling for selection bias. Impacts of restitution and SLAG programs were not 
significant, and tests of the Tenure Reform returned negative values. The LRAD program had 
a significantly postitive impact on its beneficiaries. 
Keswell et al. (2009) concludes that the impact on per capita consumption expenditure is 
positive for LRAD households when controlling for selection bias. The robustness of the 
result is showed using an instrumental variable method, as well as with utilization of the 
alternative welfare measure consumption expenditure per adult in household. The magnitude 
of the average treatment effect varies from method to method. Neither can anything be said 
about whether these effects would be sustained, muted or reversed over time, as results apply 
for the short term only. 
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6 The Quality of Life 2005 dataset 
The QoL 2005 dataset contains data on both households and the project they belong to. Of the 
3751 households in the sample, 2016 are part of ongoing projects, while the remaining 1735 
have statuses as applicants for a land transfer.  
LRAD applications must pass five stages before land is granted (Keswell, Carter and 
Deininger, 2009). Approvals on the first four stages are given at a district level, before the 
final decision is made by the Minister of Land Affairs.  
6.1 Overview of the data 
Table 5: Overview of the Quality of Life dataset 
Source: QoL 2005. 
 The first column shows the distribution of households between programs, followed by number of 
individuals. 
The dataset contains data collected from all land reform programs. 24649 individuals 
constituting a total of 3760 households were interviewed. Restitution claims have to a large 
extent been settled through money transfers, and will thus not be interesting in connection to 
my hypothesis. The focus is therefore on redistribution of land, where impact of land and land 
grants is more clear-cut.  
Programme Number of households Number of individuals Mean size of hh
Restitution - Urban 214 1421 6,6
Restitution - Rural 394 2769 7,0
Restitution - SLAG 461 3070 6,7
Restitution - LRAD 1946 12494 6,4
Redistribution - Community 106 724 6,8
Redistribution - Production/Settlement 43 254 5,9
Redistribution - Farmers Equity Scheme 44 313 7,1
Tenure - ESTA 143 909 6,4
Tenure - LTA 355 2383 6,7
Total (excluding missing values) 3706 24337 6,6
Missing values 54 312 5,8
Total 3760 24649
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Table 6: Overview of the redistribution program sample 
Program Treated Untreated Total 
SLAG 393 67 460 
LRAD 652 1294 1946 
Total 1 045 1 361 2406 
 SLAG was the initial program for accommodating transfers of rural land, and was 
succeeded by LRAD in 2001. 
 “Treated” gives the number of households that had already received land and 
“Untreated” are households that are in the process of obtaining land. 
 
The distributions of beneficiary households relative to control households in the two main 
redistribution programs are given in the table above. As SLAG was replaced by LRAD in 
2001, it was difficult to find households still in the process of obtaining land through SLAG 
to be used as control households (May, Keswell, Bjåstad and van den Brink, 2009). Average 
treatment effects of the SLAG program will not be considered due to the lack of a sufficient 
base of comparison for SLAG beneficiaries. 
6.2 Construction of the control group 
The control group consists of land reform applicants still waiting to see their applications pass 
the final threshold. The sample was chosen from the population of households that had 
submitted their applications, but not yet obtained land grants (May, Keswell, Bjåstad and van 
den Brink, 2009). It can be assumed that these households possess fairly the same abilities 
and have the same interest in obtaining land as the households in the beneficiary group.  
6.3 Problems with the data 
The community data suffers from a fairly high incidence of missing data. This information 
should have been gathered from farm managers, reform officials and others expected to 
possess full records of the relevant data on each project. Missing data therefore limits the 
range of project-specific variables than can be utilized in the analysis. 
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7 Methodology 
The analysis is conducted ex-post. A complete assessment of the impact on consumption 
expenditure per capita is not possible as only retrospective information is available about the 
surveyed households. An estimate of the impact can be found by comparing treated 
households to similar untreated households.  
Statistically identifying the true impact of receiving land is a major challenge. Selection into 
the LRAD program is not random, and whether observations are treated or not is likely to be 
correlated with the dependent variable. The problem is referred to as selection bias in the 
literature (Ravillion, 2006; Fafchamps, 2007). Observing a state of the world where a 
household has obtained land and a simultaneous state where the same household has not 
received land is a physical impossibility. As a result, if some systematic features of the 
participants or the program itself take part in determining treatment status, estimates will be 
biased (Ravillion, 2006).  
Several variables that affect selection into the program are also expected to affect 
consumption. If the beneficiary group and the control group have different distributions of 
these variables, controlling for them will not be sufficient to attenuate bias in estimates of 
average increase in consumption. When assignment of treatment is assumingly done on basis 
of observable features, it is necessary to condition on all variables that are believed to affect 
both income and treatment status. Problems will arise if the vector in question is large or 
some necessary features of the selection process are not observed (Fafchamps, 2007). 
The QoL survey is constructed using a quasi-experimental design. The design is expected to 
be less exposed to selection bias compared to non-experimental designs, where non-
participants are used as counterfactuals. The control group consists solely of individuals in the 
process of obtaining land. A propensity score matching approach will be used to attenuate 
selection bias. Beneficiary households will be matched with control households on the basis 
of observable characteristics. Selection bias will be reduced if the observable non-random 
components in the variation of selection into the program are controlled for. If non-
unobservables factors affect treatment status, proxies for these effects must be used. 
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The average treatment effect (ATE) is the average increase in consumption attributed to 
the transfer of land ownership, and is given by the difference in expected consumption 
expenditure between treated and untreated households: 
(1) ATE = E(yi,1|T = 1) − E(yi,0|T = 0) 
Adding +/- E(yi,0|T = 1) to equation (1): 
 (2) ATE = E(yi,1|T = 1) − E(yi,0|T = 1) −  E(yi,0|T = 0) − E(yi,0|T = 1)  
Equation (1) gives the single difference estimate of the treatment effect. This estimate is 
accurate if land transfers are randomly assigned. 
By manipulating the single difference estimate, equation (2) is obtained. The first two terms 
constitute the average effect of treatment on those that received it. The last term picks up 
systematic differences between treatment and control households (Ravillion, 2006), and is 
likely to be non-zero in the LRAD sample due to the requirements households must meet 
before land is granted. Inability to isolate the treatment effect from the  selection bias is 
known as the identification problem (Fafchamps, 2007). 
7.1 Choice of dependent variable 
Keswell et al. (2009) uses monthly consumption expenditure per capita in 2005 Rands as the 
dependent variable. Several welfare metrics can be used when considering the impact of a 
land transfer on living standard. Income and consumption are the most commonly used 
measures of welfare, as both give a fair representation of household welfare over time. 
Several problems may arise when measuring welfare. Households consume some goods 
privately while others are consumed in part by the surrounding community. It is thus 
important with a consistent definition of households when collecting data to avoid extensive 
variation in household sizes. The QoL-survey was therefore conducted with clear guidelines 
on which individuals to account as part of the household (May, Keswell, Bjåstad and van den 
Brink, 2009). 
Rural households in southern Africa are typically both producers and consumers of 
agricultural products. The need to keep separate records is often not considered as important 
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by households, and may entangle measurement (Deaton, 1997). Additionally, 
autoconsommation
3
 may cause difficulties when valuing a household’s expenditure and asset 
base.  
Problems with the measurement of consumption applies with greater force when measuring 
income (Deaton, 1997). Income is empirically more volatile and records of inflows are often 
hard for households to recall. For good estimates of income to be obtained, data on 
transactions must be collected with great detail; a tremendous task which is not likely to be 
properly executed (May, Keswell, Bjåstad and van den Brink, 2009).  
7.2 Estimating the impact 
Exact matching on the whole set of characteristics is not practical and may cause problems 
with degrees of freedom. Angrist (1998) provides an intuitive example of the complexity of 
exact matching. In Angrist’s example, selection into treatment is determined by 11 covariates. 
Continuous variables must be transformed into discrete form for matching to be possible. If 
the 11 covariates are transformed into the simplest type of discrete variables where 
observations are either smaller or larger than the median, the number of patterns to be 
matched with the control group is: 
211 = 2048 
Hence, even with imprecise matching on each covariate, the number of combinations that 
require a match to an equivalent pattern in the control group will be tremendous. Matching 
will give biased estimates if covariates are left out of the matching process. 
7.3 Propensity score matching 
To facilitate matching, a scalar index of observable characteristics is used as a basis for 
comparisons. The scalar index, called the propensity score, expresses the probability of being 
in the treated group. A probability is computed for each observation in the sample. 
                                                 
3
Autoconsommation is the lack of valuation of home-produced items, as these often are 
consumed without being valued by a market 
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These predicted probabilities are computed from a regression where the outcome is a binary 
indicator of treatment. The idea is to isolate all factors that affect whether a household is in 
the beneficiary group or in the control group. The propensity score is defined as the 
conditional probability of receiving the treatment, given 𝑥 (Keswell, Carter and Deininger, 
2009): 
𝑝 𝑥 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 T = 1 𝑥 = 𝐸 𝑇 𝑥  
𝑝 𝑥  is the propensity score, T is treatment status and 𝑥 is the vector of covariates explaining 
treatment status. 
Two theoretical results must be satisfied (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983): 
Assumption 1 - Balance: When conditioning on the propensity score, the 
covariates will have equal distributions for treated and 
untreated households, assignment of treatment is random 
when comparing two household with the same 
propensity score: 
                𝑥 ⊥ 𝑇|𝑝(𝑥) 
Assumption 2 - Ignorability: For the x-vector to be able to fully determine treatment 
status, selection into the program must be based on 
observable factors. If factors affecting treatment status 
are omitted or not observable, estimates will be biased. 
If the assumptions above are satisfied, we can write: 
𝐸 𝑦 𝑇 = 1, 𝑝(𝑥) − 𝐸 𝑦 𝑇 = 0, 𝑝(𝑥) = 𝐸 𝑦1 − 𝑦0 𝑝(𝑥)  
This is the average treatment effect, conditional on the vector of covariates. 
The binary variable giving treatment status is regressed on a vector of covariates believed to 
explain program selection. Households will be matched on basis of the predicted propensity 
scores. Magnitudes of the predicted estimates do not affect the outcome of the matching 
procedure as the score is just a diagnostic tool used to capture the non-random components of 
the selection process. Logit estimates take values between zero and one by construction and a 
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logit specification will therefore be used for convenience. Comparisons of consumption can 
be made in cases where households with different treatment statuses have approximately the 
same propensity score. 
7.4 Testing the balancing property 
Formal tests must be implemented to assure that the control group is not statistically different 
from the beneficiary group when the vector of chosen variables is conditioned on. The 
observations are split into blocks according to their predicted propensity scores and two tests 
are performed (Ravillion, 2006): 
1. Balance of the propensity score 
An equality of means-test is used to test whether the mean propensity score is the 
same for control and beneficiary households within each block. The outcome will 
show whether the propensity scores are uncorrelated to treatment assignment or not 
within the block. The propensity scores are split into more blocks with shorter range 
of propensity scores until all blocks have similar score means for beneficiaries and 
controls
4
. 
2. Balance of each explanatory variable 
After the correct number of blocks is determined, it is necessary to test that 
households in each block are similar with respect to each variable, independent of 
treatment status. This will confirm that the x-vector does not play a role in predicting 
treatment status for households with approximately the same propensity score. If a 
particular variable is unbalanced in a certain block, the regression specification is 
rejected due to an unbalanced set of explanatory variables. The strict requirements for 
balance ensures that households in each block are similar in all aspects captured by the 
the propensity score regression, so that effects cannot outweigh each other. 
 
                                                 
4
 The blocks formed in step 1 are used for stratification matching, which is explained in the section 1.5.1. 
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7.5 Calculating the average treatment effect 
There is a trade-off between bias and efficiency in the matching process (Keswell, Carter and 
Deininger, 2009). Non-parametric methods do not cause severe losses of information, but 
may give problems of dimensionality when operating with a large x-vector. Parametric 
methods can cope with a large amount of x-covariates, but are suitable for smaller samples. 
Three different matching approaches will be conducted: 
7.5.1 Stratification/Blocking on the propensity score 
When the balancing property is satisfied, treated and untreated households in each block will 
have the same propensity scores on average. The ATE of each block is found by the 
difference in mean outcome between the two groups in each block. Total ATE will be the 
weighted sum of the ATEs from each group, weighted according to share of observations in 
the block (Fafchamps, 2007). 
7.5.2 Nearest-neighbor matching 
Households will be matched with the closest resembling households in the control group 
according to propensity scores.  Caliper matching is nearest-neighbor matching in its most 
restrictive form, and only allows for beneficiaries to be matched with a single control 
household. Formally (Fafchamps, 2007): 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 =
1
𝑁𝑇
  𝑦1,𝑖 − 𝐸 𝑦0,𝑖 𝑇 = 1, 𝑝(𝑥)  
𝑖∈𝐼𝑇
 
Rewriting: 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 =
1
𝑁𝑇
  𝑦1,𝑖 −  𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑦0,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐼𝑇𝐶
 
𝑖∈𝐼𝑇
 
where 𝑁𝑇  is the number of treated households and 𝐼𝑇  is the set of treated observations, and 
𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗) is the weighting function. 
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7.5.3 Kernel matching 
Households are matched non-parametrically using a kernel density function. Kernel 
regression does not necessitate assumptions about the underlying distribution to estimate a 
regression function. The two previous methods use only a few control observations as 
comparisons to each beneficiary observation. The Kernel density function takes use of all 
control observations, and weights them after how much their propensity score differs from the 
beneficiary observation’s score.  
Formally (Fafchamps, 2007): 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 =
1
𝑁𝑇
  𝑦1,𝑖 −  𝑦0,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐼𝐶
𝐾  
𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑛
 
 𝐾  
𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑛
 𝑘∈𝐼𝐶
 
𝑖∈𝐼𝑇
 
K(·) is the Kernel function and 𝑎𝑛  is the bandwidth parameter The difference to nearest 
neighbor matching is the new weighting function
𝐾 
𝑝𝑗−𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑛
 
 𝐾 
𝑝𝑗−𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑛
 𝑘∈𝐼𝐶
. The weights sum to one. 
The kernel regression puts a weighted function called Kernel local to the propensity score of 
each beneficiary observation. A weight is assigned to each estimated propensity score in the 
control group based on distance from the score of the beneficiary household. The value of the 
Kernel function is at its maximum at the data point, and is monotonically decreasing in the 
distance from the maximum value (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). A larger bandwidth 
parameter allows the function to span further from the observed data point to obtain a smooth 
function between two points (Becker and Ichino, 2002). 
The major advantage of Kernel matching is the lower variance which is achieved from the use 
of more information. The drawback is the possible use of bad matches (Becker and Ichino, 
2002). 
7.6 The region of common support 
Comparisons over scores will not be possible if the propensity score perfectly predicts 
treatment status. Even with an imperfect prediction, some households will not be matched due 
to lack of an accurate match. This may occur if observations in the control group are very 
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unlikely to be in the treated group. Hence, a diverse sample is important. The analysis will 
benefit from the lack of strict guidelines for targeting of beneficiaries, in addition to a 
temporal benefit from the fact that beneficiaries have been accepted over a period of several 
years. In combination with the quasi-experimental design used, this is likely to give a 
sufficient number of matches so that results can be generalized to a majority of the 
population. 
The effect of treatment is identifiable only when observations are matched with untreated 
observations with similar attributes. Matching will only take place on the intersecting part of 
the range of propensity scores. This range is called the region of common support, and 
estimates can only be validated for households with propensity scores in this range (Ravillion, 
2006). 
If, say, several females have too low p-scores to be matched with a counterfactual, and several 
observations of men have too high scores, the estimated treatment effect will be negatively 
biased. Such result may occur even if the balancing property if satisfied within the area of 
common support, and thus calls for separate estimations in subsamples.  
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8 First assessment of the dataset 
Table 8 displays test statistics from simple t-tests of differences in per capita consumption 
between treated and untreated households in the redistribution program.  
Table 7: Testing differences in expenditure between beneficiaries and controls 
Per capita 
expenditure 
Mean, 
beneficiaries 
Mean, 
controls Number Prob(Diff>0) 
  
   
  
Redistribution, total 486,67 482,30 2394 0,4474 
  (28,44) (19,07) 
 
  
SLAG 377,91 335,63 460 0,3060 
  (33,85) (34,91) 
 
  
LRAD 552,23 489,96 1895 0,0610 
  (40,56) (19,96)     
 Standard deviations are given in parentheses below each mean. 
 Tests under the assumption of unequal variance did not alter conclusions. 
The results of simple t-tests for differences in mean expenditure between the treated and 
untreated households are given in the last column. LRAD beneficiaries have significantly 
higher expenditure at the 10% level compared to their counterfactuals, while the SLAG 
program does not reveal a significant difference.  
The apparent differences in mean consumption between SLAG and LRAD households reflect 
a shift in targeting. Removal of the maximum income ceiling and the introduction of sliding 
scale-grants made the LRAD redistribution program available for wealthier households 
compared to its precursor SLAG. 
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Graph 3: Per Capita Consumption Expenditure 
 
 Graph 3 displays monthly consumption expenditure per capita, for values less than R4000, excluding 
25 observations. 
Graph 3 gives the distribution of monthly per capita consumption expenditure for LRAD 
households given as a Kernel density estimate. The distribution of consumption expenditure is 
severely skewed towards low-expenditure households, as indicated by the spike in the graph 
for low monthly expenditures. 
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9 Multiple regression analysis 
To motivate the further analysis, monthly consumption expenditure per capita for LRAD 
households is first analyzed by multiple regression analysis. This framework does not control 
for selection bias, and will serve as a benchmark for the following propensity score analysis. 
The variable “Treatment dummy” indicates whether a household is in the beneficiary group. 
When controlling for other determinants of consumption expenditure per capita, the value of 
the estimated coefficient for the dummy variable will offer insight to whether the impact of 
receiving land on per capita consumption expenditure is positive. 
A log-specification of the dependent variable is chosen due to the positively skewed 
distribution of the underlying variable. The log-linear specification provides better fit. Its 
coefficients can be interpreted as the proximate percentage change in per capita consumption 
expenditure resulting from a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable (Rice, 2007). 
32 
 
Table 8: Regression result for log of monthly per capita expenditure consumption for 
LRAD households 
Dependent variable: Log of consumption expenditure per capita
(1) (2)
Treatment, dummy -0.0563 -0.0029   
(-1.40) (-0.07)   
Age of household head 0.0372*** 0.0381***
(4.74) (4.86)   
Age of household head, squared -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(-3.75) (-3.88)   
Proportion of adults in household 0.3024** 0.3146***
(3.23) (3.36)   
Household size -0.2573*** -0.2563***
(-16.67) (-16.64)   
Household size, squared 0.0078*** 0.0076***
(10.39) (10.15)   
Mean years of farming experience 0.0099 0.0102   
(1.75) (1.81)   
Mean years of education for adults 0.0232** 0.0256***
(3.19) (3.51)   
Education of household head, years 0.0588*** 0.0600***
(12.03) (12.26)   
Gender of household head 0.2198*** 0.2309***
(5.18) (5.43)   
Dummy, interviewed in 2007 0.1348** 
(2.95)   
Constant 4.7576*** 4.6306***
(20.26) (19.44)   
r2 0.3950 0.3980   
N 1762.0000 1762.0000   
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
39.50% of the variation in log of per capita consumption is explained by model (1). All 
coefficients other than those  of the treatment dummy and mean farming experience are 
significant at a 1% level. The gross effect on consumption of obtaining land is expected to be 
highly correlated to the other explanatory variables. As more determinants of per capita 
consumption are controlled for in the regression equation, the treatment dummy coefficient 
gets smaller. The coefficient is negative; households that have obtained land are predicted to 
have lower per capita consumption expenditures. However, the net effect of treatment after 
controlling for these variables turns out to be not significant. This can be attributed to other 
explanatory variables better explaining the variation in consumption. 
33 
 
9.1 The effect of delayed interviews 
The majority of the 1939 LRAD households were interviewed in 2005. Due to several issues 
in the interviewing process, 36% of these households were interviewed in the beginning 2007. 
91% of the households interviewed in 2007 were in the control group. If households 
interviewed in 2007 are structurally different from households in interviewed in 2005, 
consumption estimates will be biased. The effect of a late interviewing date should thus be 
taken into account.  
To illustrate this point, a second specification of the regression equation is given in column 3 
of table 9. Specification (2) includes the additional dummy variable “Interviewed in year 
2007”. This variable takes the value 1 if a household was interviewed in 2007 and the 
corresponding coefficient gives the proximate expected percentage increase in per capita 
consumption that can be attributed to the delayed interview.  
Households interviewed in 2007 are expected to have 12.7% higher per capita consumption 
than similar households interviewed at an earlier date. A comparison of the two specifications 
reveals that this effect is captured mainly by the treatment dummy variable when omitting the 
interview date-dummy. Both regressions capture approximately the same proportion the 
variance in the dependent variable. While the treatment dummy is predicted to have a 
significant effect on log per capita consumption at the 19.1% significance level in the first 
specification, the level has risen to 95.9% when controlling for the effect of interview delays. 
It is evident that being interviewed at a later date has a certain gross effect on per capita 
consumption, a result further confirmed by the lack of changes in other coefficients from the 
inclusion of the interview dummy. As the majority of households interviewed in 2007 are in 
the control group, the negative bias on consumption from selection into the treated group can 
be attributed to a shift in beneficiary targeting. 
9.2 Explaining per capita consumption expenditure 
Households with young household heads are likely to have lower consumption than 
comparable households with an older head. The effect is decreasing in age, as the squared 
household age-variable has a weak, but significant negative coefficient. Members of male-
headed households are expected to consume approximately 22.69% more each month than 
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similar female-headed households. An additional year of education of the household head 
raises expected per capita consumption of the household by approximately 6.15%. 
Living in a large household has a massive negative impact, as monthly per capita 
consumption expenditure is expected to be lower by 26,08%  compared to a household with 
one less person. Economics of scale will give a weakly positive effect, given by the positive 
coefficient of the squared household size-variable.  
The variable “Proportion of adult in the household” reflects the distribution of adults relative 
to children in the household. Having a 10 percentage point larger proportion of males between 
15 and 60 is predicted to increase monthly consumption expenditure by 29.43%.  
Education and farming experience of the household members is another main determinant of 
consumption. Mean values of farming experience and education affect consumption 
positively, with a one-year increase in the average education of the household having a 
predicted effect on consumption of twice the size of a similar increase in average farming 
experience. 
The coefficient of the treatment dummy takes the value -0.0029 which tells us that a 
household already given land at the time of the interview is expected to consume goods worth 
0.29% each month compared to control household, when holding other relevant factors 
constant. The coefficient is not significant at reasonable levels. Omitting the treatment 
dummy from the regression equation does not significantly alter magnitudes or p-values of 
other coefficients. Hence, the framework does not return results indicating that land transfers 
through the LRAD program have significantly improved per capita consumption expenditure 
for households. 
The magnitude of the treatment dummy will be biased if features of the program or its 
beneficiaries systematically affect consumption. If a variable is positively correlated both 
selection into the program and consumption, the coefficient of the treatment dummy would be 
positively biased. The next section will offer an estimate of the treatment effect on 
consumption when controlling for selection bias. 
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10 The propensity score regression 
Propensity score matching is constructed to attenuate selection bias. By comparing 
households that are equal in all aspects believed to affect selection into the LRAD program, 
valid estimates of treatment effect can be computed. 
It is crucial to estimate an appropriate propensity score regression that captures the non-
random component of the variation in selection into the program. Omitting variables will 
reduce the matching procedure’s ability to eliminate selection bias. The predicted propensity 
scores express the probability of a household being in the treated group, calculated on basis of 
significant differences between the two groups.  
The chosen explanatory variables are tested for equality of means between beneficiaries and 
the control group. The results clearly indicate that assignment into the treatment group is not 
random. 
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10.1 Explanatory variables 
Table 9: Difference in means for propensity score variables 
 Standard deviations are displayed underneath each mean value. 
 The last column gives p-values from t-tests of whether mean variable value in beneficiary group is 
significantly different from its equivalent in control group. 
Previous access to land is expected to have a negative effect on probability of being in the 
treated group, as the reform intends to distribute land to previously disadvantaged groups. The 
first two variables capture land available to households before 1995. The variable “Land 
allocated post 1994, dummy” indicates whether land was allocated to the household in the 
year 1995 or later. This variable is an aggregation of the three following dummies, which 
accounts for the authority responsible for the transfer. 
The other variables reflect household characteristics that are expected to differ between 
beneficiary households and the counterparts in the control group. The dummy variable 
Total Treated Control N diff≠0
Number of plots, pre 1995 0,649 0,663 1,312 1869 0,000
1,397 0,940 1,524
Size of plots, pre 1995 424,257 301,168 482,312 1869 0,213
-2936,464 905,336 3506,600
Land allocated post 1994, dummy 0,190 0,134 0,217 1869 0,000
0,392 0,340 0,412
Land allocated from other farmer post 1994, dummy 0,044 0,005 0,063 1869 0,000
0,206 0,071 0,243
Land allocated from tribal authorities post 1994, dummy 0,042 0,047 0,040 1869 0,509
0,201 0,211 0,196
Land allocated from municipal authorities post 1994, dummy 0,104 0,085 0,113 1869 0,062
0,306 0,279 0,317
Household head is male 0,712 0,747 0,694 1935 0,016
0,453 0,435 0,461
Education of household head, years 5,883 5,954 5,846 1932 0,648
4,913 5,005 4,867
Household size 6,632 6,426 6,736 1939 0,117
4,100 3,760 4,260
Household size, squared 60,785 55,417 63,505 1939 0,035
79,916 63,157 87,082
Age of household head 53,908 54,700 53,506 1929 0,084
14,338 13,818 14,583
Mean age of household 29,980 31,145 29,389 1934 0,002
11,651 12,875 10,936
Mean years of farming experience in household 1,609 1,793 1,516 1776 0,112
3,463 3,587 3,398
Proportion of hh members with other farming experience 0,336 0,361 0,323 1871 0,034
0,365 0,386 0,354
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indicating whether the household head is male or not is likely to be important due to LRAD’s 
targeting of women (Department of Land Affairs, 2009). 
The LRAD program was constructed to trigger commercial farming, and the two last 
variables on the list reflecting farming experience of the household members will thus be 
important. “Mean years of farming experience in household” is the average farming 
experience in the household, where commercial and non-commercial agricultural experience 
are weighted equally. The variable “Proportion of hh members with other farming 
experience” gives the proportion of the adults in the household with non-commercial farming 
experience. The proportion is calculated on basis of the adults in the household. Adults are 
defined as household members between 15 and 65. Having other farming experience is a 
more prominent feature than having commercial farming experience among individuals in the 
treated group.  
The remaining variables are household characteristics which can be expected to differ 
between the two groups due to shifts in targeting over time. Vague initial guidelines 
combined with the inexperience of the land reform officials have given a diversified group of 
treated households. Using a t-test, it is shown that household size, education of household 
head and age of the household head have different distribution across groups. 
The variables used are believed to capture the non-random component of selection into the 
LRAD program. Effects that are not captured by observables must be captured through 
proxies. Whether structural differences can be found between the two groups when it comes 
to characteristics such as risk aversion, entrepreneurship and innovation will not be directly 
observable. The variable giving education of the household head can to some extent be 
expected capture such unobservable features. 
Household size returns a non-significant difference in mean. Irrespective, this covariate is 
included in the analysis, as it is an important characteristic of a household and highly 
correlated to consumption per capita. 
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10.2 Propensity score regressions 
Table 10: Propensity score regressions 
Dependent variable: Treatment status
Specification 1 Specification 2
Treatment, dummy                
Total landholdings before 1994, in hectares -0.0000                
(-0.80)                
Number of plots accessed before 1994 -0.6724*** -0.6081***
(-11.18) (-11.07)   
Land allocated from other farmers after 1994 -3.1636*** -3.2243***
(-5.29) (-5.43)   
Land allocated from tribal authorities after 1994 -0.7158** -0.5490*  
(-2.61) (-2.19)   
Land allocated from municipal authorities after 1994 -0.6893*** -0.9605***
(-3.56) (-5.31)   
Gender of household head 0.2400 0.2888*  
(1.87) (2.41)   
Education of household head, years -0.0233 -0.0220   
(-1.77) (-1.79)   
Household size 0.2808***                
(4.92)                
Household size, squared -0.0108***                
(-3.62)                
Age of household head 0.0045 0.0092*  
(0.98) (2.20)   
Mean age in household 0.0190**                
(2.77)                
Mean years of farming experience 0.0170                
(1.00)                
Proportion of adults with other farming experience 0.3665*                
(2.09)                
Constant -2.1684*** -0.5487   
(-4.92) (-1.85)   
Pseudo-R² 0.1147 0.0952
N 1700 1854
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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The propensity score regressions are estimated using a logit functional form. The binary 
treatment status variable is regressed on factors believed to determine whether households 
have been assigned plots, or are still in the process of obtaining land. Two specifications of 
the propensity score regression that will be used in the analysis are presented in table 12. 
10.2.1 Matching on a large number of independent variables 
Specification (1) includes a large number of independent variables. The pseudo r-squared
5
 of 
0.1147 is the highest of the two, and the model is thus explaining the non-random variation in 
treatment status best. Previous access to land has the expected negative effect. The number of 
plots accessed by the household during apartheid has a strong impact, while the effect of total 
size of plots is insignificant. Transfers of land after apartheid from the three main allocators of 
land do all have the expected negative coefficients. 
The coefficient of the household head gender-variable is positive as expected, but is 
insignificant. Hence, one can conclude that the LRAD program has not been successful in its 
targeting of females. 
The number of individuals in the household was one of the main determinants of consumption 
expenditure per capita in the regression equation estimated in section 9. The probability of 
being in the treated group is increasing size of the household. Problems of collinearity may be 
introduced through high correlation between covariates. However, as the following analysis is 
only concerned with predicted values of the propensity score and not magnitudes of the 
separate coefficients, this issue can be ignored. 
The Department for Land Affairs proclaimed the targeting of young individuals as highly 
prioritized (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2001). As a result, the age of the 
household head is expected to be lower for household that have seen their applications 
approved. For each year older the household head is, the probability of already having 
received land grants increase by 0.00454. Thus, the program failed to target the young in its 
initial phases, although the positive coefficients may reflect a change in policy towards 
allowing younger individuals to pass through the first milestones in the application process. 
Mean age of the household returns a significant effect on treatment status. Higher mean age 
                                                 
5
 The pseudo r-squared ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates a perfect fit. Since there is no equivalent to the R-
squared calculated for ordinary least squares model for non-linear models such as logit regression models, the 
pseudo r-squared must be used. 
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increases the probability of being in the treated group. Age is likely to be correlated with 
other factors such as education and farming experience, which are important criteria for 
selection. 
Experience with agricultural production is one of the main targeting criteria, as the LRAD 
program aims at improving South Africa’s agricultural capacity. The proportion of the 
household with other farming experience has a significant effect on the probability of being in 
the beneficiary group. Average years of farming experience of a household return an 
insignificant coefficient at the 5% level. The variable is still included due to its theoretical 
importance. 
10.2.2 Reducing the number of covariates 
The eight covariates used in specification (2) return a pseudo-R² of 0.0941, which is 
considerably lower than for the previously described specification. The relatively weaker 
ability to explain treatment status can be attributed to the reduced number of explanatory 
variables. Conclusions about the performance of the specification the must be considered with 
great care. Although a lower pseudo-R², the set of chosen variables in specification 2 might 
capture the observed and unobserved characteristics of the selection more precisely. Variables 
that capture random variation in the selection process will not take part in removing selection 
bias. 
As variables are excluded from the regression, coefficients and their p-values are altered. 
Variables giving mean age and farming experience of the households have the expected signs, 
though significance is impaired. The variables are nevertheless included due to their 
theoretical relevance. The four variables capturing households’ access to land in their pre-
application state have the expected negative coefficients, with land allocated from other 
farmers’ post 1995 as the strongest predictor of treatment status. 
Household gender affects probability of being in the treated group to a larger extent, 
compared to specification 1. Age and education of the household head have the expected 
coefficient values. 
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10.3 Testing the balancing property 
The predicted values of the propensity score must be tested to assure that that the group of 
beneficiary household is not statistically different from the control group households when 
conditioning on the score. 
10.3.1 Balance of the propensity score 
The first test is concerned with the balance of the predicted propensity score values. The 
estimated scores are split into intervals, and a t-test is used to confirm that the difference in 
mean propensity scores between the two groups is not significantly different from zero. If the 
difference is significant at probability values lower that 0.01, the score is split into shorter 
ranging intervals, and the test is performed again. 
Table 11: Propensity score balance - Specification 1
6
 
Block Max p(x) Range N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t t, rejection 
 
1 0,099 0,099 16 203 -0,008 -1,287 2,344 
 
2 0,200 0,099 32 177 0,000 -0,009 2,344 
 
3 0,300 0,099 93 274 -0,007 -2,066 2,337 
 
4 0,400 0,100 119 251 -0,005 -1,545 2,337 
 
5 0,598 0,198 208 233 -0,012 -2,334 2,335 
 
6 0,762 0,160 73 21 0,000 0,003 2,368 
 
 The estimated propensity scores are split into blocks after size of estimate. 
 The largest estimated in each block is given in column 2. 
 The column with the header “Difference in mean” given the difference between mean propensity score for 
beneficiary- and control households in the block. 
 The t-values are given from a t-test for difference between score mean for beneficiaries and controls 
 The critical values at a 1% level are given in the last column. 
 The propensity scores will be split into smaller blocks if means differ within a block, thus if the absolute 
value of the t-statistic exceeds the critical value. 
The values in the column “Difference in mean” are negative if the mean of the beneficiary 
households exceed the mean score of the control group within the block.  
The estimated propensity scores from logit-specification 1 are split into six blocks satisfying 
the balancing property. Mean predicted propensity score differs significantly between control 
group and beneficiary group if the t-statistic exceeds the absolute value of the critical limit, 
given in the last column.  
                                                 
6
 The propensity scores are estimated and tested using pscore.ado by Becker and Ichino, presented in the article 
”Estimation of average treatment effects based on propensity scores” (2002). 
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Table 12: Propensity score balance - Specification 2 
Block Max p-score Range N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t t, rejection 
 
1 0,100 0,099 12 205 -0,003 -0,366 2,344 
 
2 0,199 0,099 30 167 0,000 0,025 2,346 
 
3 0,400 0,200 247 574 -0,011 -2,328 2,331 
 
4 0,500 0,099 154 203 -0,001 -0,278 2,337 
 
5 0,600 0,099 146 101 -0,006 -1,672 2,342 
 
6 0,626 0,024 8 7 0,000 0,004 2,650 
 
 The estimated propensity scores are split into blocks after size of estimate. 
 The largest estimated in each block is given in column 2. 
 The column with the header “Difference in mean” given the difference between mean propensity score for 
beneficiary- and control households in the block. 
 The t-values are given from a t-test for difference between score mean for beneficiaries and controls 
 The critical values at the 1% level are given in the last column. 
 The propensity scores will be split into smaller blocks if means differ within a block, thus if the absolute 
value of the t-statistic exceeds the critical value. 
The propensity score estimated on the reduced number of covariates is split into six balanced 
blocks. An important difference between the two specifications is how the predicted scores in 
the midsection of the range are split. In the latter, block three ranges from a probability of 
0.199 to 0.400. A total of 821 observations are found within this block. This cluster of 
observations seems to be more evenly distributed towards the upper range of scores in the full 
specification, as the first blocks are quite similar in range and amount of observations.  
10.3.2 Balance of the explanatory variables 
After confirming that the blocks contain balanced propensity scores, one must ascertain that 
each covariate is balanced. This will confirm that the x-vector does not play a role in 
predicting treatment status for households with approximately the same propensity score 
(Ravillion, 2006). If differences in means of a variable between the two groups are significant 
within a block, the model specification is rejected. 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Table 13: Balance of the explanatory variables - Specification 1 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of plots, pre 1995 0,79 0,22 0,51 0,21 0,02 - 
Size of plots, pre 1995 0,76 0,68 0,62 0,68 0,85 0,59 
Land all. farm., post1994 0,21 - - - - - 
Land all. trib., post 1994 - 0,26 0,19 0,33 0,10 - 
Land all. muni., post 1994 0,78 0,06 0,94 0,60 0,07 - 
H.h. head male 0,78 0,86 0,21 0,83 0,11 0,85 
Edu. h.h. head 0,27 0,09 0,41 0,28 0,74 0,96 
H.h. size 0,02 0,11 0,49 0,44 0,03 0,14 
H.h. size, sq 0,03 0,08 0,47 0,45 0,01 0,20 
Age, h.h. head 0,69 0,55 0,63 0,59 0,28 0,66 
Mean age of h.h. 0,21 0,22 0,28 0,38 0,22 0,21 
Mean farm. exp. 0,76 0,49 0,58 0,78 0,94 0,35 
Prop. with other farm. exp. 0,10 0,90 0,69 0,17 0,56 0,25 
 Values are p-values for the mean variable value for beneficiaries not being significantly different from the 
mean value for controls. 
 Specification is rejected if any p-values are less than 0.01. 
 Values are missing when blocks do not contain both beneficiary and control observations, and when 
differences in means are equal to zero. 
Table 14 gives p-values for the difference between mean of the variable for control 
households and beneficiaries being non-zero. If no means differ, the vector of explanatory 
variables used to explain treatment status is balanced once conditioning on the estimated 
propensity score. The significance level used in the analysis is 1%, so variables exhibiting 
values of less than this limit will be considered as unbalanced.  
The occurrence of non-reported p-values is attributed to the fact that some blocks contain few 
observations, and tests of variables with low variation may default. This is particularly a 
problem for dummy variables indicating features rarely occurring in the dataset, such as land 
allocated by farmers. 
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Table 14: Balance of the explanatory variables - Specification 2 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of plots, pre 1995 0,39 0,33 0,61 0,81 0,23 - 
Land all. farm., post1994 0,37 - - - - - 
Land all. trib., post 1994 0,81 0,38 0,33 0,05 0,23 - 
Land all. muni., post 1994 - 0,19 0,30 - - - 
H.h. head male 0,93 0,16 0,25 0,38 0,49 - 
Edu. h.h. head 0,72 0,02 0,76 0,56 0,50 - 
Age, h.h. head 0,64 0,61 0,92 0,66 0,86 1,00 
 Values are p-values for the mean variable value for beneficiaries not being significantly different from 
the mean value for controls. 
 Specification is rejected if any p-values are less than 0.01. 
 Values are missing when blocks do not contain both beneficiary and control observations, and when 
differences in means are equal to zero. 
Table 15 exhibits the same result, variable means are statistically equal when the propensity 
score is kept constant. Block six contains too few observations for testing to be fully 
implemented, but fulfills the requirements of balance. 
10.4 Calculating the average treatment effect 
Table 15: Average treatment effects on per capita consumption expenditure 
 Values marked * are significant at the 10% level. 
 The ATE-column gives average treatment effect of monthly consumption expenditure per capita on 2005 Rands.  
 Standard errors from the Kernel matching are found using bootstrapping
7
. 
Average treatment effects on treated (ATE) are calculated using the various matching 
procedures explained in section 7. The column “ATE” gives the average increase in per capita 
                                                 
7
 When estimating the average treatment effect with the non-parametric method Kernel matching, standard errors 
must be estimated using bootstrapping. When the probability distribution is unknown, numerous re-samples can 
be randomly drawn from the sample to estimate the standard error of the distribution (Rice 2007). A large 
number of re-samplings are required.  
Method Treated obs. used Control obs. used ATE SE t
The single difference 652 1,287 62,26* 40,25 1,54
Using propensity score regression 1:
Stratification 541 1159 81,09 49,61 1,63
Nearest neighbor 541 346 99,22 62,28 1,59
Kernel 541 1148 70,853* 42,86 1,65
Using propensity score regression 2:
Stratification 597 1257 31,65 52,68 0,60
Nearest neighbor 652 445 62,66 68,70 0,91
Kernel 652 1287 23,93 49,67 0,48
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consumption expenditure from attributed to receiving land. Stratification matching is based on 
the blocks derived in the previous section.  
The single difference gives the difference between mean consumption expenditure per capita 
for beneficiary and control households, and is significantly positive at the 10% level. This 
estimate is not adjusted for selection bias.  
In contrast to the non-significant treatment effect found in section 9, a positive average 
treatment effect significantly different from zero at the 10% level is found when using Kernel 
matching. Although this result is not confirmed by the other matching approaches, we can 
conclude that the average treatment effect of being allocated land on monthly consumption 
expenditure per capita is positive when controlling for selection bias.  
Selection bias in program impact is present if characteristics that increase the probability of 
being in the treated group also affect consumption. The significant ATE-estimate from Kernel 
matching is larger than the single difference. Thus, estimates are higher when selection bias is 
controlled for, indicating a negative bias. In other words, features that affect the probability of 
being in the treated group are negatively correlated to consumption. The pattern is evident 
when comparing the two propensity score models. The average treatment effects are higher 
for all matching approaches when utilizing a logit specification with more independent 
variable and better fit. Thus, the better the model is at attenuating selection bias, the higher 
will estimates be.  
The multiple regression analysis in section 9 provided an analysis of consumption per capita, 
where household size and the education level of the household head were shown to be main 
determinants. The same variables are used in the extended propensity score regression. 
Household size displayed both a negative impact on consumption a positive effect on the 
probability of being in the beneficiary group. An equivalent opposite correlation is found for 
the education level. This is an apparent source of the dominant negative selection bias. 
Households in the treated group are on average both larger and have less educated household 
heads compared to their counterfactuals. Treatment effects will be negatively biased due to 
the effect these variables have on household consumption. This may be due to the failure land 
reform officials to implement the new targeting criteria of the LRAD program. 
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However, the large standard deviations indicate that the differences within the sample are 
substantial, and suggest further testing. 
Table 16: Average treatment effects found by Keswell, Carter and Deininger (2009) 
Source: Keswell, Carter & Deininger (2009), p. 17. 
 Estimates in the last section are computed on basis of a reduced sample. The authors used qualitative surveys to 
gather information about households in the control group, and screened out projects deemed unlikely to be 
approved. 
Keswell et al. (2009) estimated substantially higher average treatment effects. The authors 
used results from a separate qualitative survey to construct the variables “Days in the 
application process” and “Distance from project plot to closest Land Reform office”. These 
variables were used in the propensity score regression to isolate treatment status. As these 
variables were not available for my analysis, it is reasonable to assume that the estimates 
found were higher due to better ability to capture the negative selection bias. 
The screened sample exhibit stronger impacts of the land reform. The qualitative surveys 
were conducted in an effort to ensure similarity between beneficiaries and the counterfactuals. 
The higher estimates are due to reduced homogeneity in the control group, indicating a 
stronger relationship between land transfers and consumption compared to the findings 
presented here. 
 Nevertheless, whether results are sustained in subsamples were not tested by Keswell et al. 
(2009). 
 
Method Definition N, benef. N, control ATE SE t
Single Difference Per capita 75,18 37,97 1,98
Estimates when using full sample:
Stratification Per capita 511 2154 143,93 56,43 2,55
Nearest neighbour Per capita 511 303 65,32 73,16 0,89
Kernel Per capita 511 1063 134,24 54,88 2,45
Estimates when using screened sample:
Stratification Per capita 349 1047 149,87 84,42 1,78
Nearest neighbour Per capita 394 143 148,28 91,54 1,62
Kernel Per capita 394 382 169,18 77,55 2,18
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10.5 Differences in average treatment effects 
between male and female-headed households 
The large standard deviations found in the previous analysis suggest further testing. This 
section will look at differences in treatment effects for households with male and female 
household heads by separate matching within these subsamples. Differences between 
subsamples may indicate inappropriateness of the propensity score method on the full sample 
if the region of common support is too limited. 
Table 17: Gender of household head by treatment status 
  Female Male Total 
Control households 392 891 1,283 
Beneficiary households 165 487 652 
Total 557 1378 1,935 
 Table shows the number of LRAD households with male and with and female household 
heads split into control- and beneficiary groups. 
71.24% of the sampled LRAD households have a male head. As described in section 2, 
female-headed households account for a disproportionate fraction of South African 
households with incomes below the poverty line. Targeting of females have been one of the 
main priorities of the redistribution program (Department of Land Affairs, 2008). It is 
therefore of great interest to see whether the reform in isolation has been able to alleviate 
poverty of this specific group. 
A specification including all suitable explanatory variables will be used to estimate propensity 
scores in the two subsamples. Intuitively, the dummy variable indicating the gender of the 
household head cannot be included in these specifications. Slight alterations to adapt to the 
features of the subsamples are therefore necessary for the logit regressions to satisfy the 
balancing properties. 
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Table 18: Propensity score regressions for the household head gender subsamples 
The variable giving proportion of household members with non-commercial farming 
experience is omitted in the subsample of female heads due to failure to satisfy the balancing 
property.  
Dependent var.: Treatment status
Specification Males, 1 Males, 2 Females, 1 Females, 2
Treatment, dummy                
Total landholdings before 1994, in hectares -0.0000 0.0002                
(-1.01) (1.12)                
Number of plots accessed before 1994 -0.7304*** -0.6537*** -0.5696*** -0.5151***
(-10.20) (-9.99) (-4.76) (-4.95)   
Dummy, land allocated post95 -1.1348*** -1.2881*** -0.9546** -0.9260***
(-5.90) (-7.18) (-3.22) (-3.43)   
Education of household head, years -0.0263 -0.0291* 0.0050 0.0101   
(-1.74) (-2.07) (0.19) (0.40)   
Household size 0.2874*** 0.2579*                
(4.27) (2.27)                
Household size, squared -0.0100** -0.0130*                
(-2.87) (-2.06)                
Age of household head 0.0105 0.0146** -0.0036 0.0023   
(1.84) (2.87) (-0.43) (0.31)   
Mean age in household 0.0149 0.0278*                
(1.88) (2.02)                
Mean years of farming experience 0.0123 -0.0079                
(0.66) (-0.21)
Proportion of adults with other farming experience 0.6602**                
(3.24)                
Constant -2.2277*** -0.4447 -1.8455* -0.4491   
(-4.39) (-1.36) (-2.19) (-0.85)   
Pseudo-R² 0.1234 0.0949 0.0745 0.0545
N 1210 1320 490 534
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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The coefficient has the expected signs in the subsample of male-headed households. Several 
coefficients are deviating from its expected values in the subsample containing the female-
headed counterparts. Years of education affect the probability of being in the beneficiary 
group positively, in contrast to the effect for males. Another difference is the negative 
coefficient of the age variable for household heads in the female subsample. Female 
household heads do exhibit higher education and lower age, more in line with the targeting 
criteria of the reform (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2001). 
The coefficient of mean farming experience in the household is negative for females, which is 
surprising with regards to the outline of the LRAD program. A possible explanation can be 
the targeting of women, allowing women into the program even though the household in 
question lacks the ideal farming experience. The coefficient also reflects that the female-
headed households in the control group have more farming experience on average, indicating 
improved targeting of experienced beneficiaries. 
The specification used to predict treatment status for male heads has a substantially better fit 
than the models for female household heads. This may be attributed to the substantially lower 
number of observations in the sample of female-headed households, and the fact that the full 
sample on which the initial regressions were calculated on the basis of consists of mainly 
male household heads. As seen in section 10.4, there is a sharp decline in model fit when the 
amount of explanatory variables is reduced. 
The balancing property is satisfied both for all predicted propensity scores and for the 
corresponding vector of explanatory variables used
8
. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Tests of the balancing property are given in the Appendix 
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Table 19: Average treatment effects on per capita consumption expenditure for 
households with male heads 
Method Treated obs. used Control obs. used ATE SE t t, rejection 
Using propensity score regression 1:           
Stratification 403 807 91,12 63,39 1,44 1,65 
Nearest neighbor 487 334 154,19* 78,60 1,96 1,65 
Kernel 487 891 85,72* 62,61 1,74 1,65 
Using propensity score regression 2:           
Stratification 450 870 39,91 64,91 0,62 1,65 
Nearest neighbor 487 334 32,89 85,15 0,39 1,65 
Kernel 487 891 21,01 65,23 0,32 1,65 
 The ATE-column gives average treatment effect of monthly consumption expenditure per capita on 2005 Rands.  
 The critical values in the column headed “t, rejection” are given at a 10% significance level. 
 Values marked * are significant at the 10% level. 
 Standard errors from the Kernel matching are found using bootstrapping. 
Table 20: Average treatment effects on per capita consumption expenditure for 
households with female heads 
Method Treated obs. used Control obs. used ATE SE t t, rejection9 
Using propensity score regression 1:           
Stratification 132 358 51,80 72,45 0,72 1,65 
Nearest neighbor 165 125 -13,51 79,78 -0,17 1,65 
Kernel 165 392 40,56 64,32 0,63 1,65 
Using propensity score regression 2:           
Stratification 147 387 24,36 69,53 0,35 1,65 
Nearest neighbor 165 125 58,08 79,08 0,73 1,65 
Kernel 165 392 30,72 65,27 0,47 1,65 
 The ATE-column gives average treatment effect of monthly consumption expenditure per capita on 2005 Rands.  
 The critical values in the column headed “t, rejection” are given at a 10% significance level. 
 Values marked * are significant at the 10% level. 
 Standard errors from the Kernel matching are found using bootstrapping. 
Average impacts for male household heads are the only significant impacts when using 
nearest neighbor matching and Kernel matching on basis of the full propensity score 
regression. It is thus hard to conclude on differences in magnitudes. However, it can be stated 
that the households in the sample headed by males have a positive effect on consumption 
from receiving land through the LRAD program, while one cannot conclude whether female-
headed households have had any significant effect of the reform. 
The pattern of negative selection bias described in section 10.4 is also seen here, estimates are 
increasing in the amount of explanatory variables that are conditioned on. The higher 
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estimates of households with a male household head can thus possibly be attributed to the 
better fit of the propensity score regressions used when matching male-headed households. It 
is also reasonable to assume that stronger effects would have been found if the propensity 
score models had provided better ability to reduce selection bias, in particular for female 
household heads. If the inability to explain treatment status for female households is due to a 
more randomized selection, results will not be distorted by selection bias. 
10.6 Testing for provincial differences in average 
treatment effects 
Table 23 sums up the estimated average treatment effects by province. Specification 2 with 
the additional explanatory variable “Proportion of household members with farming 
experience” is used in the logit regression explaining treatment status on which the estimated 
propensity scores are matched. The logit models used to predict treatment statuses provide 
good fit in line with the models previously used, although the number of explanatory 
variables is reduced. The model specification used satisfies the balancing properties for all 
provinces
10
. 
Table 21: Summing up average treatment effects on per capita consumption expenditure 
by province
11
 
* estimate significant at the 0.1-level 
** estimate significant at the 0.05-level 
*** estimate significant at the 0.01-level 
                                                 
10
 Full tables of regressions, estimations and the balance of the propensity score and the variables are given in the 
appendix. 
11
 Detailed data on the matching is provided in table 30 in the Appendix. 
Control, N Benef., N Stratification Nearest neighbor Kernel
Limpopo 41 108 113,52* 80,25 92,11
Mpumalanga 155 242 -219,22* -467,86* -225,96
North West 189 187 95,63 133,78 107,84*
Gauteng 52 135 369,12** 400,09*** 306,69
Northern Cape 30 200 -106,14 18,98 -178,86
KwaZulu Natal 490 495 447,85** 360,53* 433,45**
Free State 236 281 86,51 88,61 93,19
Western Cape 309 104 11,03 73,97 11,89
Eastern Cape 199 251 -615,22** -481,47* -593,38
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The provincial differences are substantial and clear-cut. Impact on per capita consumption 
expenditure attributed to the transfer of land varies greatly among the provinces. Mpumalanga 
and Eastern Cape has a severe negative treatment effect that is significant at reasonable levels. 
At the other end of the scope, the estimates of average treatment effects found for the Gauteng 
and KwaZulu-Natal stand out with large and significant effects of LRAD projects. Hence, 
some provinces can be said to be very successful in their effort to promote poverty alleviation 
through the framework of the reform, while others have failed considerably.  
As described in section 2.1, poverty differs greatly on the provincial level. The two regions 
with headcount poverty rates substantially lower than the national average, Gauteng and 
Western Cape, exhibit large differences in average treatment effects. The average 
performance of Gauteng beneficiaries is second only to beneficiaries in KwaZulu-Natal. 
Apart from Western Cape and Gauteng, South Africa’s provinces are similar in their fractions 
of the population having consumption expenditures per capita beneath the poverty line. The 
two poorest provinces are Eastern Cape and Limpopo (The National Treasury, 2008). The 
unambiguously negative treatment effect of land transfers in the Eastern Cape Province is in 
stark contrast to the positive effect found in Limpopo. These differences are likely to be 
attributed to differences in targeting by local authorities. 
Due to insufficient data provided by the Department of Land Affairs, comparisons over 
average costs and project sizes between provinces cannot be made. There were no national 
requirements for reporting of initiated projects in the period in which this thesis is concerned. 
This has resulted in extensive variation in the project-specific information reported on the 
provincial level, which puts severe restrictions on the ability to analyze differences in 
provincial treatment effects. 
Whether differences between the provincial estimates are statistically significant is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Further analysis on this matter is suggested. However, estimates are fairly 
precise and consistent for the variety of matching approaches, indicating a statistical 
difference. 
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11 Conclusion 
The average effect on monthly consumption expenditure per capita of being allocated land 
through the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development-program is positive. A 
negative selection bias is apparent, as average treatment estimates are positively correlated to 
the ability of the propensity score regression to reduce bias. The negative selection bias can be 
attributed to features that are both negatively correlated to consumption and positively 
affecting the probability of being in the treated group. Examples of such features are 
household size and education of the household head. The results are not robust to the variety 
of matching methods applied, as the Kernel matching approach is the only method returning a 
significantly positive average treatment effect. 
The average impacts found are of lesser magnitude compared to the average treatment effects 
found by Keswell et al. (2009). The results are likely lower due to weaker ability to reduce 
selection bias. 
Testing of the subsamples of household with male household heads and female household 
heads separately revealed that impacts of the LRAD program depends on the gender of the 
household head. The results indicate that households with male heads have a positive effect 
on consumption per capita from receiving land through the LRAD program. The results 
provide no clear answers to whether female-headed households realize significant effects of 
the reform. The estimate of average treatment effects for males was substantially higher than 
the estimate for the full sample, which is an indication that male-headed households realized a 
greater average effect from obtaining land trough LRAD. A negative selection bias is found in 
these subsamples and results may be distorted if the inability to capture factors affecting the 
probability of being in the treated group is due to unobservable systematic factors and not due 
to randomized selection.  
Estimations of average treatment show large provincial differences. Mpumalanga and Eastern 
Cape showed large negative average impacts on consumption, while estimates for Gauteng 
and KwaZulu-Natal were large and positive. It is therefore of great importance to review the 
LRAD program at a provincial level. 
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The differences are likely to be attributed to differences in targeting by local authorities. The 
two richest provinces Gauteng and Western Cape exhibit large differences in average 
treatment effects, the same is the case for the two poorest provinces, Eastern Cape and 
Limpopo. As the reported data on the LRAD program in the period 2001-2006 has several 
severe shortcomings, it is hard to conclude on a relationship between average project sizes, 
average costs and average impacts on consumption.  
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12 Appendix 
Table 22: Propensity score balance for households with female heads 
Block Max p(x) Range N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t t, rejection 
1 0,200 0,199 15 126 -0,031 -2,055 2,353 
2 0,400 0,200 85 184 -0,019 -2,502 2,340 
3 0,491 0,089 24 44 -0,006 -1,122 2,384 
4 0,576 0,075 3 8 -0,013 -0,782 2,821 
5 0,606 0,000 0 1 - -  
 The estimated propensity scores are split into blocks after size of estimate. 
 The largest estimated in each block is given in column 2. 
 The column with the header “Difference in mean” given the difference between mean propensity score for 
beneficiary- and control households in the block. 
 The t-values are given from a t-test for difference between score mean for beneficiaries and controls 
 The critical values at the 1% level are given in the last column. 
 The propensity scores will be split into smaller blocks if means differ within a block, thus if the absolute 
value of the t-statistic exceeds the critical value. 
Table 23: Balance of the explanatory variables for households with female heads 
Specification 1     
 1 2 3 4 
Number of plots, pre 1995 0,06 0,98 0,51 - 
Size of plots, pre 1995 0,40 0,22 0,30 - 
Land all. post 1994 0,02 0,06 - - 
Edu. h.h. head 0,37 0,87 0,68 0,03 
H.h. size 0,03 0,54 0,67 0,61 
H.h. size, sq 0,05 0,31 0,90 0,48 
Age, h.h. head 0,18 0,62 0,73 0,52 
Mean age of h.h. 0,93 0,85 0,52 0,71 
Mean farm. exp. 0,27 0,62 0,69 0,39 
 Values are p-values for mean variable value for beneficiaries not being significantly different from the 
mean value for controls. 
 Specification is rejected if any p-values are less than 0.01. 
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Table 24: Propensity score balance for male household heads, specification 1 
Block Max p(x) Range N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t t, rejection 
1 0,200 0,197 38 269 -0,017 -1,934 2,339 
2 0,400 0,200 135 338 -0,006 -1,125 2,334 
3 0,499 0,098 74 106 -0,001 -0,224 2,347 
4 0,598 0,097 83 53 -0,011 -2,093 2,354 
5 0,800 0,199 73 35 -0,019 -1,754 2,362 
6 0,812 0,010 6 0 - -  
 The estimated propensity scores are split into blocks after size of estimate. 
 The largest estimated in each block is given in column 2. 
 The column with the header “Difference in mean” given the difference between mean propensity score for 
beneficiary- and control households in the block. 
 The t-values are given from a t-test for difference between score mean for beneficiaries and controls 
 The critical values at the 1% level are given in the last column. 
 The propensity scores will be split into smaller blocks if means differ within a block, thus if the absolute 
value of the t-statistic exceeds the critical value. 
Table 25: Balance of the explanatory variables for male household heads 
Specification 1      
 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of plots, pre 1995 0,16 0,10 0,38 0,27 0,65 
Size of plots, pre 1995 0,45 0,48 0,97 0,0681 0,77 
Land all. post 1994 0,23 0,48 0,19 0,08 - 
Edu. h.h. head 0,08 0,81 0,83 0,04 0,60 
H.h. size 0,06 0,30 0,03 0,36 0,77 
H.h. size, sq 0,05 0,35 0,02 0,32 0,56 
Age, h.h. head 0,58 0,22 0,24 0,92 0,59 
Mean age of h.h. 0,11 0,62 0,23 0,21 0,15 
Mean farm. exp. 0,55 0,19 0,67 0,71 0,18 
Prop. with other farm. exp. 0,02 0,08 0,70 0,87 0,71 
 Values are p-values for mean variable value for beneficiaries not being significantly different from the 
mean value for controls. 
 Specification is rejected if any p-values are less than 0.01. 
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Table 26: Average treatment effects on p.c. consumption expenditure for households 
with male heads 
Method Treated obs. used Control obs. used ATE SE t 
Using propensity score regression 1: 
    
  
Stratification 403 807 91.122 63.389 1.437 
Nearest neighbor 487 334 154.187 78.601 1.962 
Kernel 487 891 85.722 62.608 1.369 
Using propensity score regression 2: 
    
  
Stratification 450 870 39.912 64.914 0.615 
Nearest neighbor 487 334 32.893 85.147 0.386 
Kernel 487 891 21.007 65.232 0.322 
 The ATE-column gives average treatment effect of monthly consumption expenditure per capita on 2005 
Rands.  
 The critical values in the column headed “t, rejection” are given at a 10% significance level. 
 Values marked * are significant at the 10% level. 
 Standard errors from the Kernel matching are found using bootstrapping. 
 
Table 27: Average treatment effects on p. c. consumption expenditure for households 
with female heads 
Method Treated obs. used Control obs. used ATE SE t 
Using propensity score regression 1: 
    
  
Stratification 132 358 51.802 72.445 0.715 
Nearest neighbor 165 125 -13.506 79.783 -0.169 
Kernel 165 392 40.559 64.315 0.631 
Using propensity score regression 2: 
    
  
Stratification 147 387 24.362 69.533 0.350 
Nearest neighbor 165 125 58.078 79.080 0.734 
Kernel 165 392 30.718 65.272 0.471 
 The ATE-column gives average treatment effect of monthly consumption expenditure per capita on 2005 
Rands.  
 The critical values in the column headed “t, rejection” are given at a 10% significance level. 
 Values marked * are significant at the 10% level. 
 Standard errors from the Kernel matching are found using bootstrapping. 
62 
 
Table 28: Propensity score regressions for province samples 
 
Limpopo Mpuma. North W. Gauteng N. Cape KwaZulu-N. Free S. W. Cape E. Cape
Treatment, dummy                 
Pr. of adults with other farming 0.9896 0.9814* 1.1013* 0.0833 0.6016 -1.0943* 0.5430    0.7798 -0.4669
(1.04) (2.01) (2.21) (0.09) (0.49) (-2.07) (1.36)    (1.67) (-1.31)
No. of plots accessed before 94 -0.2110 -0.6805*** -0.2003 3.4032** -1.0844* -0.4668*** -0.9417*** -0.0955 -1.3371***
(-0.50) (-4.02) (-1.03) (2.84) (-2.57) (-4.71) (-4.72)    (-0.29) (-6.01)
Land all. from farmers after 94 0.0000 -0.2625 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -2.5959* 0.0000    -1.5837 0.0000
(.) (-0.20) (.) (.) (.) (-2.48) (.)    (-1.42) (.)
Land all. from tribal auth. after 94 -2.3245* 0.0000 -1.5798 0.0000 0.6126 0.1394 0.0000    0.6218 0.3072
(-2.28) (.) (-1.26) (.) (0.40) (0.31) (.)    (0.59) (0.39)
Land all. from muni. auth. after 04 0.8414 0.0000 -1.6726** 0.0000 -1.5035 0.7618 -0.2778    -1.0293 -1.8128***
(0.64) (.) (-2.70) (.) (-1.47) (0.86) (-0.81)    (-1.47) (-3.93)
Gender of household head 0.0305 0.8998* -0.3737 0.8426 -0.5043 1.0601** 0.5242    -0.1579 -0.0003
(0.04) (2.18) (-1.07) (1.07) (-0.60) (2.97) (1.61)    (-0.38) (-0.00)
Edu. of household head, years -0.1219 -0.1059* 0.0109 0.2601* 0.0916 -0.0476 -0.0364    -0.0130 -0.0624
(-1.66) (-2.18) (0.27) (2.25) (1.10) (-1.22) (-1.03)    (-0.28) (-1.87)
Age of household head -0.0078 -0.0190 0.0019 -0.0337 0.0124 0.0116 -0.0240*   0.0207 0.0546***
(-0.27) (-1.11) (0.14) (-1.16) (0.42) (1.02) (-1.97)    (1.53) (4.55)
Constant jan.30 0.2624 0.0131 -3.2233 0.2700 -1.6804* 1.0122    -1.7537 -1.4188
(0.64) (0.25) (0.01) (-1.66) (0.12) (-1.99) (1.13)    (-1.69) (-1.75)
Pseudo-R² 0.1551 0.2016 0.0718 0.2190 0.1663 0.1674 0.1053 0.0574 0.2326
N 64 186 178 74 53 418 288 172 300
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 29: Propensity score balance for propensity score regressions for each province 
Limpopo
Block Max psm N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t
1 0,171 1 5 -0,094 -
2 0,387 2 10 0,057 1,4365
3 0,578 10 9 0,019 0,6859
4 0,798 5 20 -0,001 -0,0264
5 0,860 1 1 0,045 -
19 45
Mpumalanga
Block Max psm N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t
1 0,096 1 37 -0,009 -
2 0,194 9 20 0,000 -0,027
3 0,391 10 38 -0,036 -1,8069
4 0,590 18 19 -0,004 -0,2168
5 0,794 23 10 -0,035 -1,682
6 0 1
61 125
North West
Block Max psm N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t
1 0,188 20 4 -.027409 -2.1549
2 0,400 14 24 -.023596 -1.4050
3 0,598 47 51 -.0230869 -2.2320
4 0,788 11 7 -.0150868 -0.6127
92 86
Gauteng
Block Max psm N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t
1 0,194 2 21 -0,087 -2,250
2 0,395 7 16 -0,019 -0,663
3 0,415 8 1 0,009 -
4 0,593 2 21 -0,552 1,956
5 0,702 0 3 - -
6 0,950 8 0 - -
27 62
Northern Cape
Block Max psm N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t
1 0,151 0 6 - -
2 0,385 4 6 0,072 3,007
3 0,574 7 10 -0,016 -0,569
4 0,757 11 2 -0,088 -2,417
5 0,880 5 2 0,008 0,288
27 26  
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KwaZulu Natal
Block Max psm N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t
1 0,198 23 281 -0,021 -1,894
2 0,399 21 60 -0,018 -1,084
3 0,592 19 12 -0,032 -1,750
4 0,683 1 1 -0,075 -
64 354
Free State
Block Max psm N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t
1 0,198 12 73 -0,001 -0,089
2 0,299 10 35 -0,024 -2,476
3 0,398 22 34 -0,006 -0,750
4 0,599 37 49 -0,023 -1,838
5 0,760 13 3 0,004 0,162
94 194  
Western Cape
Block Max psm N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t
1 0,199 5 27 -0,024 -1,198
2 0,398 27 70 -0,002 -0,190
3 0,537 19 22 -0,004 -0,376
4 0,659 2 0 - -
53 119  
Eastern Cape
Block Max psm N, benef. N, control Difference in mean t
1 0,188 8 59 -0,024 -1,645
2 0,399 54 30 -0,003 -0,241
3 0,590 23 35 -0,008 -0,538
4 0,797 32 15 -0,027 -1,547
5 0,965 41 3 -0,019 -0,724
158 142  
 The estimated propensity scores are split into blocks after size of estimate. 
 The largest estimated in each block is given in column 2. 
 The column with the header “Difference in mean” given the difference between mean propensity score for 
beneficiary- and control households in the block. 
 The t-values are given from a t-test for difference between score mean for beneficiaries and controls. 
 The critical values at a 1% level are given in the last column. 
 The propensity scores will be split into smaller blocks if means differ within a block, thus if the absolute 
value of the t-statistic exceeds the critical value. 
 Missing values are due to either that characteristics is not observed in the block, or if there are too few of 
either control or beneficiary observations in the block. 
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Table 30: Balance of the covariates in the propensity score regressions for each province 
Limpopo 
        1 2 3 4 5 
 Number of plots, pre 1995 - 0,50 0,85 0,40 - 
 Land all. farm., post1994 - - - - - 
 Land all. trib., post 1994 - - 0,36 - - 
 Land all. muni., post 1994 - - - 0,80 - 
 H.h. head male - 0,42 0,34 0,17 - 
 Edu. h.h. head - 0,98 0,72 1,00 - 
 Age, h.h. head - 0,90 0,95 0,98 - 
 Prop. with other farm. exp. - 0,75 0,12 0,36 - 
 
       Mpumalanga 
        1 2 3 4 5 
 Number of plots, pre 1995 - 0,56 0,79 0,53 - 
 Land all. farm., post1994 - - 0,47 0,3374 - 
 Land all. trib., post 1994 - - - - - 
 Land all. muni., post 1994 - - - - - 
 H.h. head male - 0,12 0,33 0,41 - 
 Edu. h.h. head - 0,51 0,83 0,53 0,12 
 Age, h.h. head - 0,24 0,63 0,93 0,41 
 Prop. with other farm. exp. - 0,31 0,20 0,77 0,52 
 
       North West 
        1 2 3 4 
  Number of plots, pre 1995 0,43 0,48 0,44 0,17 
  Land all. farm., post1994 - - - - 
  Land all. trib., post 1994 0,53 0,19 0,34 - 
  Land all. muni., post 1994 0,53 0,18 - - 
  H.h. head male 0,22 0,06 0,89 0,28 
  Edu. h.h. head 0,55 0,06 0,42 0,92 
  Age, h.h. head 0,29 0,67 0,82 0,38 
  Prop. with other farm. exp. 0,20 0,45 0,12 0,22 
  
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
66 
 
Gauteng 
        1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of plots, pre 1995 - - - - - - 
Land all. farm., post1994 - - - - - - 
Land all. trib., post 1994 - - - - - - 
Land all. muni., post 1994 - - - - - - 
H.h. head male 0,10 0,37 - - - - 
Edu. h.h. head 0,39 0,58 - 0,02 - - 
Age, h.h. head 0,69 0,36 - 0,01 - - 
Prop. with other farm. exp. 0,02 0,59 - 0,26 - - 
       Northern Cape 
        1 2 3 4 5 
 Number of plots, pre 1995 - 0,78 1,00 0,92 - 
 Land all. farm., post1994 - - - - - 
 Land all. trib., post 1994 - 0,45 - 0,69 0,58 
 Land all. muni., post 1994 - 0,65 0,23 - - 
 H.h. head male - - 0,80 0,74 0,51 
 Edu. h.h. head - 0,15 0,20 0,19 0,17 
 Age, h.h. head - 0,20 0,96 0,52 0,12 
 Prop. with other farm. exp. - 0,54 0,84 0,53 0,15 
 
       KwaZulu Natal 
        1 2 3 4 
  Number of plots, pre 1995 0,79 0,16 0,85 - 
  Land all. farm., post1994 0,19 
  
- 
  Land all. trib., post 1994 0,62 0,47 0,23 - 
  Land all. muni., post 1994   0,56 0,63 - 
  H.h. head male 0,04 0,14 0,75 - 
  Edu. h.h. head 0,54 0,81 0,33 - 
  Age, h.h. head 0,81 0,39 0,92 - 
  Prop. with other farm. exp. 0,59 0,24 0,22 - 
  
       Free State 
        1 2 3 4 5 
 Number of plots, pre 1995 0,84 0,79 0,15 0,74 - 
 Land all. farm., post1994 - - - - - 
 Land all. trib., post 1994 - - - - - 
 Land all. muni., post 1994 0,34 0,85 0,05 0,37 0,25 
 H.h. head male 0,09 0,51 0,09 0,24 0,43 
 Edu. h.h. head 0,51 1,00 0,99 0,60 0,43 
 Age, h.h. head 0,29 0,33 0,58 0,94 0,45 
 Prop. with other farm. exp. 0,41 0,92 0,54 0,60 0,77 
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       Western Cape 
        1 2 3 4 5 
 Number of plots, pre 1995 0,19 0,96 0,66 - - 
 Land all. farm., post1994 0,67 
  
- - 
 Land all. trib., post 1994   0,54 0,92 - - 
 Land all. muni., post 1994 0,54 0,83 
 
- - 
 H.h. head male 0,94 0,87 0,90 - - 
 Edu. h.h. head 0,25 0,19 0,32 - - 
 Age, h.h. head 0,60 0,64 0,93 - - 
 Prop. with other farm. exp. 0,65 0,75 0,88 - - 
 
       Eastern Cape 
        1 2 3 4 5 
 Number of plots, pre 1995 0,40 0,56 0,17 0,56 0,70 
 Land all. farm., post1994 - - - - - 
 Land all. trib., post 1994 - 0,18 0,82 0,96 0,64 
 Land all. muni., post 1994 0,40 0,82 0,82 0,50 - 
 H.h. head male 0,48 0,91 0,98 0,27 0,27 
 Edu. h.h. head 0,07 0,30 0,52 0,62 0,22 
 Age, h.h. head 0,08 0,35 0,20 0,98 0,87 
 Prop. with other farm. exp. 0,06 0,49 0,43 0,42 0,48 
  Values are missing when blocks do not contain both beneficiary and control observations, and when 
differences in means are equal to zero. 
 Values are p-values for mean variable value for beneficiaries not being significantly different from the 
mean value for controls. 
 Specification is rejected if any p-values are less than 0.01. 
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Table 31: Average treatment effect for each province 
N, benef. N, cont. ATE SE t t, rejection
At the 10% level At the 5% level At the 1% level
Limpopo
Stratification 33 31 113,52 88,68 1,28 1,67 2,00 2,66
Nearest Neighbor 33 12 155,40 89,85 1,73 1,68 2,02 2,70
Kernel 33 25 88,76 103,12 0,86 1,67 2,00 2,67
Mpumalanga
Stratification 62 124 -219,23 118,24 -1,85 1,65 1,97 2,60
Nearest Neighbor 63 33 -494,31 310,40 -1,59 1,66 1,99 2,63
Kernel 63 98 -229,36 125,81 -1,82 1,65 1,97 2,61
North West
Stratification 76 102 95,63 116,72 0,82 1,65 1,97 2,60
Nearest Neighbor 76 45 130,39 138,52 0,94 1,66 1,98 2,62
Kernel 76 93 115,01 126,72 0,91 1,65 1,97 2,61
Gauteng
Stratification 19 55 369,13 149,78 2,47 1,67 1,99 2,65
Nearest Neighbor 27 8 432,33 123,95 3,49 1,69 2,03 2,73
Kernel 27 26 290,62 294,30 0,99 1,68 2,01 2,68
Northern Cape
Stratification 27 26 -106,15 503,84 -0,21 1,68 2,01 2,68
Nearest Neighbor 27 9 -92,48 643,09 -0,14 1,69 2,03 2,73
Kernel 27 20 -177,52 660,39 -0,27 1,68 2,01 2,69
KwaZulu Natal
Stratification 64 354 447,86 180,83 2,48 1,65 1,97 2,59
Nearest Neighbor 64 44 385,98 204,29 1,89 1,66 1,98 2,62
Kernel 64 339 433,22 185,72 2,33 1,65 1,97 2,59
Free State
Stratification 94 194 86,51 191,87 0,45 1,65 1,97 2,59
Nearest Neighbor 94 62 59,80 200,76 0,30 1,65 1,98 2,61
Kernel 94 189 91,92 190,51 0,48 1,65 1,97 2,59
Western Cape
Stratification 51 121 11,04 96,30 0,12 1,65 1,97 2,61
Nearest Neighbor 53 35 95,44 101,77 0,94 1,66 1,99 2,63
Kernel 53 102 9,08 80,84 0,11 1,65 1,98 2,61
Eastern Cape
Stratification 134 166 -615,22 286,53 -2,15 1,65 1,97 2,59
Nearest Neighbor 134 55 -556,55 304,68 -1,83 1,65 1,97 2,60
Kernel 134 140 -596,28 247,22 -2,41 1,65 1,97 2,59
